In 2007, the Norwegian government reformed the vehicle registration tax in order to reduce the carbon intensity of the new car fleet by incentivizing the purchase of more fuel efficient cars. This paper identifies the impact of the new tax structure on three main dimensions: (i) the average CO 2 emissions intensity of new registered vehicles, (ii) the relative change in sales between low and high polluting cars and (iii) the market share of diesel cars. A Difference in Difference approach is employed to estimate the short run effects on each outcome variable of interest. The results show that the average CO 2 intensity of new vehicles was reduced in the year of the implementation of the reform by about 7.5 g of CO 2 /km. This reduction is the result of a 12 percentage points drop in the share of highly polluting cars and of an increase of about 20 percentage points in the market share of diesel cars.
Introduction
Reducing automobile pollutant emissions is a critical step to mitigate climate change. The transportation sector, which produces 23% of world energy-related CO 2 emissions, is the second-largest sector of energy consumption. Almost three quarters of transport emissions come from road transport, specifically passenger cars and light-duty trucks. 1 There are many approaches to reducing transportation emissions including the development of more fuel-efficient vehicles; the use of alternative fuels that come from renewable resources such as biofuel, hydrogen, and electricity; and the reduction of demand for vehicle travel by, for example, improving public transportation or bike lanes. In practice, the most widely used economic incentives for reducing road transport emissions fall into two categories: "command and control" regulation, such as emissions standards, and market-based incentives, such as fiscal instruments like carbon taxes. These approaches are interconnected and complement each other. The European Commission, for instance, has set CO 2 emissions targets for manufacturers specifically directed at new passenger cars to improve fuel efficiency through technological development. 2 At the same time, EU-Member States are independently implementing diverse fiscal measures including vehicle taxes to encourage the purchase of new vehicles with lower CO 2 emissions, and fuel taxes or circulation taxes, to control transportation activities. 3 This study assesses the effects of a recent policy intervention designed to influence the demand for private cars. In 2007, the Norwegian government reformed the Vehicle Registration Tax (VRT) system. The VRT is an upfront tax for new vehicles, which accounts for about half of the retail price. The government explicitly indicated that the objective of the reform was to reduce the intensity of CO 2 emissions of the average car fleet by incentivizing the purchase of more fuel-efficient cars. 4 The reform substituted the engine size component of the registration tax with the CO 2 emissions intensity component. This change increased the sensitivity of the tax to CO 2 emissions. As a consequence, consumers who purchase vehicles at the more efficient end of the distribution save about 10,000 NOK, while those who opt for relatively fuel-inefficient vehicles face an increase of about 50,000 NOK. 3 See van Essen (2012) for an overview of carbon-based vehicles taxation schemes in the European Union. 4 The CO 2 emissions intensity is a measure based on the expected grams of CO 2 that a vehicle will produce per kilometer driven and it is measured in gCO 2 /km.
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What are the environmental effects of calculating the vehicle registration tax on CO 2 emissions intensity? To answer this question, I use a Difference in Differences (DID) approach to identify the short-run impact of the 2007 reform on three main outcome variables: 1) the average CO 2 emissions intensity of new registered vehicles, 2) the relative change between low and high polluting cars and 3) the market share of diesel cars. 5 This reduced-form approach offers a clear and simple identification of the response parameters of interest and is particularly well-suited for establishing causality (Timmins and Schlenker (2009) ). 6 The choice of method is particularly appropriate because of the quasi-experimental nature of the phenomenon of interest. Other studies that have used reduced-form models to investigate related problems are Klier and Linn (2012) , Klier and Linn (2013) , Klier and Linn (2010) , Hastings (2004) and Busse et al. (2006) . The main data are provided by the Norwegian Road Federation OFVAS and contain repeated cross sections of new vehicles' monthly registrations in each municipality in Norway. 7 The results suggest that the fiscal change induced a reduction of about 7.5 gCO 2 /km in the average CO 2 performance of new cars in 2007, which corresponds to 4.3% decrease from the pre-treatment average and account for about 20% of the standard deviation. Between 2006 and 2007 the average CO 2 intensity of the new car fleet dropped from 173 to 160 gCO 2 /km. The estimated causal impact of the reform, net of the anticipation effects, corresponds to about half of the overall reduction in the observed CO 2 intensity, which includes exogenous factors such as fuel efficiency improvements associated with the supply side of the market (Figure 1 ). The estimated reduction in CO 2 intensity is the combined result of a shift in demand toward greener vehicles and an increase in the market share of diesel cars. Specifically, the tax reform caused a reduction of about 12 percentage points in the share of high emitting vehicles, i.e. those emitting more than 180 gCO 2 /km, and an expansion between 19 and 21 percentage points of the share of diesel cars within the year of the reform. Furthermore, no significant change in the number of new sales is found indicating that the VRT reform has mainly induced substitution effects.
When using a fiscal instrument to reduce CO 2 emissions, it is critical to assess its effectiveness. Examples of such instruments include feebates, vehicle registration taxes, circulation taxes and fuel taxes. The use of these instruments for climate policies has become increasingly popular, but they have been implemented very differently by different countries. As a consequence, evidence of their economic and environmental effects is complex to assess and some-5 The effects are estimated over a nine-month period within the year of the intervention. 6 In this study, I aim to complement the large body of literature which makes use of structural models such as Bresnahan (1987); McCarthy (1996) ; Berry et al. (1995) . Generally, these models do not focus primarily on vehicle taxes. times conclusions are conflicting (Mandell (2009) ). Some studies argue that upfront taxes, such as registration taxes, are the most effective instruments because they counterbalance consumer myopia in evaluating future costs. Consumers are more responsive to upfront taxes as purchasing decisions are more sensitive to upfront prices and taxes than to the expected lifetime costs of the car (Allcott and Wozny (2012) , Brand et al. (2013) , Kågeson (2005) , ICCT (2014), Greene et al. (2005) ). However, registration taxes affect only new vehicles sales, whereas fuel and circulation taxes impact both new and used vehicles. Fuel taxes are effective as they act on two dimensions, discouraging the intensity of transport activities and encouraging the shift to more fuel efficient vehicles (Goodwin et al. (2004 ), Sterner (2007 ). While there is disagreement about which policy is ultimately most effective, there is agreement that CO 2 -differentiated vehicles taxation can produce large reductions in emissions (COWI (2002) ). Moreover, CO 2 -differentiated tax and feedbate are more politically acceptable because of potential revenue neutrality, while an increase in fuel taxes is politically unpopular (Greene et al. (2005) ).
The majority of studies on the effects of environmental policies are done exante and are mostly based on simulations (BenDor and Ford (2006) , Giblin and McNabola (2009), Greene et al. (2005) ) and Skippon et al. (2012) ). The present work belongs to the relatively small, but growing literature on ex-post evaluation of CO 2 -differentiated taxes which have been recently introduced in Europe. Various studies have shown that differentiating vehicle taxes on CO 2 emissions is an effective measure to reduce CO 2 intensity, though the magnitude of the results differs across countries and across instruments used. In 2008, France reformed its vehicle registration tax introducing a feebate system. 8 As a consequence, an average decrease of 5% in CO 2 emissions is estimated in the short run, but the generosity of the subsidy increased the sales of new cars by 13% and cost 285 million euro to the state budget. Hence, D'Haultfoeuille et al. (2014) conclude that the environmental shortrun impact of the feebate is negative. CO 2 -differentiated circulation taxes introduced in Germany and Sweden deliver less clear effects on the average CO 2 intensity of new vehicles compared with the French feebate, confirming that consumers are generally more responsive to upfront taxes (Klier and Linn (2012) ). Gerlagh et al. (2015) consider 15 European countries and find that a one percent increase in the CO 2 sensitivity of registration taxes reduces the CO 2 intensity of the new fleet by 0.06-0.13 percent. The most relevant point of comparison for Norway is perhaps Ireland. Neither country has a car manufacturing industry, so their policies focus mainly on the demand side of the market. Like Norway, Ireland has substituted the engine size component of its vehicle registration tax with CO 2 performance. Ireland has gone a step further by also differentiating the circulation tax with respect to CO 2 emissions. Results from Rogan et al. (2011) are in line with the present work. In particular, they find a larger short term effect of about 13% reduction of CO 2 intensity, brought about primarily by the shift to diesel-powered vehicles.
The paper is organized as follows: background information specific to Norway is presented in the next section followed by a descriptive analysis of the Norwegian tax system for vehicles and the reform of the VRT in 2007. The data are presented in Section 3, where the main variables of interest are described. Section 4 explain in detail the empirical approach and the identification strategy for the outcome variables of interest. Section 5 discusses the main results, while section 6 presents effects on some additional variables. Finally, the conclusions are provided at the end of the paper.
Institutional Background
Oil was discovered in Norway in the 1960s, and as a result, Norway is one of the wealthiest countries in the world. The strict correlation between GDP and demand for private vehicles is generally well known, and Norway is no exception (Figure 18 ). Predictably, as the stock of private cars and mileage driven has increased, so have GHG emissions. Emissions of CO 2 , the main greenhouse gas, from Norwegian road transport are reaching levels almost 30% higher than those of 1990, making road transport one of the fastest growing sources of CO 2 emissions in the country. 9 However, Norway has taken preventive actions and thanks to the introduction of more energyefficient vehicles as well as the blending of hybrids and electric cars, it is well in line with the goal of reducing CO 2 emissions intensity by 40% by 2020. 10 See Figure 19 for a graphical comparison of the CO 2 emission intensity trend for new vehicles in Norway and other European countries.
Vehicle Registration Tax
Purchase, ownership, and usage taxes serve as economic incentives to affect car purchase and usage decisions. In Norway, these policies are implemented through four elements. The registration tax (1) for new vehicles is a onetime fee paid at the moment of purchase and it accounts for almost half of the retail price. Ownership taxes for passenger cars consist of a flat annual circulation fee (2), and a reclassification fee (3), which applies only to used vehicles. 11 Fuel taxes (4) are determined by various factors including the CO 2 content of the fuel. Historically, the first three elements were primarily levied for state revenue, while fuel taxes reflect road use, accidents and other environmental costs.
This paper focuses on the vehicle registration tax (1). Since 1996, the registration tax has been proportionally linked to three characteristic of a vehicle: its weigh; its engine size; and its power. In 2007, the component of the tax calculated according to engine displacement was substituted with the vehicle's potential CO 2 emissions intensity. In other words, beginning in January 2007, the registration tax on private vehicles became a stepwise function of weight (kg), power (kW), and CO 2 intensity (gCO 2 /km).
In order to understand the implications of the 2007 reform, it is important to assess the interdependence among the components of the tax, and how each component affects the monetary value of the registration tax. Engine size, power, and weight are all positively correlated with CO 2 emissions and respectively with each other (Table 1) . Hence, by directly calculating the tax over CO 2 intensity as well as over weight and power, the total vehicle registration tax became more sensitive to CO 2 emissions than it was before the reform in 2007. The increase of CO 2 sensitivity is depicted in Figure 2 , which highlights the relationship between the total registration tax in 2006 and in 2007 and the CO 2 intensity with linear fitted values differentiated by fuel. For levels between 200 and 300 gCO 2 /km the registration tax is higher in 2007 than it was in 2006. Moreover, the difference in tax between diesel and gasoline is reduced. It is also possible to evaluate the change in tax paid before and after the reform of 2007 by clustering vehicles according to market segment. The first column of Table 2 
Data
The main data used in this study were provided by the Norwegian Road Federation OFVAS 12 and contain detailed information about 670 000 new passenger cars sold in Norway between 2004 and 2009. I hold repeated cross section data with monthly registrations by vehicle specification in each municipality of Norway, i.e. panel data at month and municipality level. 13 Vehicle specifications are defined by brand, model, weight, engine displacement, power, potential CO 2 emissions, fuel type, number of doors, and transmission type. Vehicle-specific taxes have been calculated on the basis of these characteristics following the scheme provided by OFVAS.
Other information regarding population, yearly gross income per capita for Norwegian municipalities, and average fleet age at the county level was provided by Statistic Norway (SSB). 14 Monthly average fuel prices and fuel taxes for both gasoline and diesel in Norway were provided by the Institute of Transport Economics (TØI). 15 Summary statistics for the most relevant vehicle characteristics are reported in Table 3 . 
Main variables
This study identifies the causal effects of 2007 reform of the registration tax on three main outcome variables: CO 2 emissions intensity, the share of high polluting cars, and the market share of diesel cars. The following descriptive analysis reveals several important changes in the characteristics of the passenger vehicle fleet in Norway between 2004 and 2009. The overall decline of the trend illustrated in Figure 1 is due in part to improvements in fuel efficiency of the vehicles available on the market and in part to a shift on the demand side. Demand-side responses by Norwegian consumers include a shift toward less polluting cars and toward diesel-fuelled, rather than gasoline-fuelled, vehicles. The next sections describe in more details each of the three main outcome variables of interest. Vehicles with zero emissions are electric, gas, hybrid and hydrogen cars which account for about 2% of the sample.
Low-versus high-polluting vehicles
Examining the purchases of different classes of vehicles is another way to understand what happened in the months immediately before and after the 2007 reform. Figure 4 shows the market share of new cars purchased by the CO 2 thresholds used in the calculation of the registration tax. It appears that the discontinuity observed in the CO 2 intensity trend is an intertemporal substitution between high-and low-polluting cars. This substitution is clearly visible in Figure 4 , where opposite trends are depicted for different kinds of vehicles in the two panels. Sales of vehicles with low CO 2 intensity in the left panel, i.e. those emitting less than 180 gCO 2 /km decrease before January 2007 and increase immediately after. Vehicles with high CO 2 intensity reported in the right panel show the opposite trend. Figure 5 plots only the share of highly-polluting cars, which is the second outcome variable considered in this study. (Table 3 ). The increasing trend can be partially explained by specific taste for the superior fuel efficiency of diesel engines and the relatively lower price of fuel. In Norway, fuel prices are lower for diesel than for gasoline (Figure 20 ), but vehicle taxes favor gasoline cars ( Figure  12 ). Because diesel cars are generally associated with lower CO 2 intensity, after the 2007 reform, diesel cars became relatively cheaper to buy ( Figure 12 ). Specifically, the difference in registration tax for diesel and gasoline cars decreased from an average of 56 000 NOK in 2006 to an average of 32 000 NOK in 2007. This paper demonstrates that part of the increase in the market share of diesel cars was the result of the registration tax reform of 2007 and this pattern is consistent with other studies such as Gerlagh et al. (2015) and Rogan et al. (2011) . More discussion regarding the characteristics of diesel cars is reported in the Appendix A. What is the impact of differentiating the vehicle registration tax on CO 2 emissions intensity? To answer this question, I use a Difference in Differences (DID) approach and exploit the reform of 2007 to estimate the causal environmental effects, in the short run. Specifically I estimate the impact of the reform on three outcome variables: average CO 2 emissions intensity, the share of highly polluting cars, and the share of diesel vehicles. In this section I explain how much of the changes observed in these variables are associated with the tax reform of 2007.
By using the DID estimator it is possible to calculate the causal effect net of time trends and market seasonality, and control for exogenous factors that are potentially relevant for the outcome variables. For instance, the average CO 2 intensity of vehicles purchased in the nine months before the reform is about 12.6 g of CO 2 per kilometer higher than the average for those bought after the reform. Considering only this simple difference, however, produces a biased estimation of the real change in the average CO 2 intensity of the new fleet as long as the time trend is non-zero. As discussed previously, the reduction in CO 2 intensity is in fact due to both a supply and a demand effect.
The DID method is used to evaluate the impact of a treatment on an outcome variable over a population. Generally, the population is divided in two groups: those who receive the treatment (the treated), and those who do not (the control group). This allows for a direct comparison, under specific assumptions, between the control and the treatment group. In this paper, the tax reform was applied to all vehicles in the market at the same time in Norway. Hence, there is no optimal control group in the standard sense. When dealing with cross sectional data, however, it is possible to compensate for the lack of control group by employing previous observations in time, when comparable to the primary observations of interest. Similar strategies have been used by Schönberg and Ludsteck (2012) , Zweimüller (2009), Lalive et al. (2010) and Ekberg et al. (2013) .
In order to isolate the causal impact of the reform, observation of the outcome variables in previous years, when no reform took place, are used as a control. Following a standard DID procedure, Equation (1) In order to have an unbiased estimation of the treatment effect δ, some assumptions must be verified. The model needs to be correctly specified and the error term needs to be uncorrelated with the variables in the equation. The identifying assumption is that treatment and control observations differ only because of the treatment. In other words, the Common Trend Assumption (CTA) states that in absence of intervention treatment and control groups would have common trends. This assumption is, in principle, untestable, however, a testable implication is that the pre-intervention trends in the control and treatment should be parallel. This implication is often used to infer the plausibility of the CTA. This study compares the trends for the time periods employed in the estimations in Appendix B.
The similarity in trends, lies in the seasonality of the car market. The comparability between treatment and control observations is reasonable given the regularity in the production cycles for cars. In the European market, one cycle correspond to a calendar year, meaning vehicles characteristics are constant for twelve-month periods. It is enough to attribute the observable trend in the outcome variables as an exogenous factor intrinsic with the supply side, and exploit the same months from the previous year as a feasible control group. To visually verify the seasonal regularity of the car market, the treatment group and control group are compared in Appendix B. If we exclude the months immediately before and after the reform, the trends in the years of interest are analogous. This guarantees that the causal effect of the reform can be identified as the gap between the trends before and after the reform.
Possible threats to identification can arise in presence of exogenous factors affecting the outcome variables differently in different years/months. This study includes relevant time-varing control variables: annual per capita gross income at the municipality level, monthly fuel prices in Norway, and the average fleet age at the county level.
Results
This section presents and discusses the overall findings of the paper. To evaluate the causal impact of the registration tax reform of 2007, the treatment effect is estimated for each outcome variable of interest Y r,t using Equation 1. The averages for the outcome variables are calculated at the municipality level for the 36 months used in the analysis.
The treatment effect δ can also be calculated in a more direct and intuitive way by following the definition of the DID estimator. See, for example, Table 4 which exemplifies this calculation for the outcome variable CO 2 intensity. The DID estimator calculates the difference between the pre-and post-reform averages in the year of the intervention (treatment) minus the difference between the same time intervals in the control. -14.81 -7.41 -7.4 Comparing the CO 2 intensity averages before and after the reform, we find a reduction of 12.55 g of CO 2 per km. This result cannot be interpreted as a consequence of the intervention. The observed reduction is due to a combination of improvements in fuel efficiency of the vehicles available on the market and a shift in the demand side, which could be a reaction to the 2007 reform of the registration tax. Using the DID approach we learn that the causal impact of tax reform on the demand is about 60% of the overall reduction observed before and after the reform. Specifically, Table 4 reports a reduction of 7.4 gCO 2 /km, which corresponds to about a 4.3% of the pre-treatment average. This simple calculation can be compared with the results of the OLS estimation reported in Table 5 . The advantage of OSL is the possibility of introducing control variables and the convenience of calculating standard errors.
All models reported in Table 5 are weighted on the number of car sold and have robust standard errors clustered on municipalities to account for similarities in demand in different time periods within the same municipality. For each outcome variable of interest Column (2) includes potentially relevant time-varying control variables: gross income at municipality level, the ratio between diesel and gasoline fuel prices, and the average age of the car fleet in the 19 Norwegian counties. All the treatment effects are highlighted in the first row of Table 5 . They are highly significant and stable when including control variables.
For the outcome variable CO 2 intensity, the model estimates a change between 7.4 and 7.6 gCO 2 per km. The interpretation of these coefficients is that the reform caused a reduction in average CO 2 intensity of about 4.3% from the pre-treatment average within 2007 net of time trends and anticipation effects. This effect is quite large since it accounts for about 20% of the overall standard deviation. The estimated causal impact of the reform corresponds to about 60% of the overall reduction in the CO 2 intensity observed between 2006 and 2007, which includes exogenous factors such as fuel efficiency improvements associate with the supply side of the market.
To understand the mechanism behind the estimated reduction of CO 2 emissions intensity of the car fleet, this study also considers the impact of the tax reform on the share of highly polluting vehicles relative to medium-low polluting vehicles and on the share of diesel cars. Demand-side responses by the Norwegian consumers include a shift toward less polluting cars and toward more diesel-fuelled cars. Table 5 shows that the reform caused a decrease in the share of highly polluting vehicles (those emitting more than 180g of CO 2 per km) of about 12 percentage points. Diesel cars, instead, increased their market share between 19 and 21 percentage points in the short run. 
Other Variables
This section reports the impact of the 2007 reform on other characteristics of the vehicles. It is plausible to expect some change in other characteristics such as weight, power, and engine size. Moreover, given the increase of the share of diesel-fuelled cars, it is important to consider whether these vehicles have characteristics that differentiate them from the average fleet. As Figure  11 shows, the engine size, weight, and power of diesel cars are higher than those of gasoline cars. Figure 7 , 8, and 9 show the trends for weight, power, and engine size. There seems to be a small increase for weight and power, but it is not clear whether the reform created any effect in the short run. Table 6 reports the estimations for the outcome variables weight, power, and engine size. There is no significant increase in weight and a low significant increase for power. In contrast, the average engine size increased significantly in the short run. The estimated effect is about 47 ccm more in 2007. This effect correspond to a 2.6% increase from pre-treatment averages. However, from Figure 9 we notice a decrease in the trend after 2008, so even if the reform has created a short run effect, this effect disappears in the longer run. Lastly, it is also important to wonder whether the reform has induced an increase or decrease in the total number of cars sold. Figure 18 shows how the total number of sales are correlated with GDP per capita. The first column of Table 6 reports the estimated effect of the reform on the total number of registrations. The coefficient is non-significant, hence we cannot attribute any change in the number of cars sold to the implementation of the reform. 
Conclusions
This paper analyses how a recent policy intervention has affected the main characteristics of the new car fleet in Norway. In 2007, the structure of the vehicle registration tax changed. Taxation for new passenger cars became based on expected CO 2 emissions per kilometer rather than engine size. This reform was implemented with the goal of reducing the average CO 2 emissions intensity of the fleet. Using observational data on car purchases provided by the Norwegian Road Federation OFVAS, I estimate with a Difference in Differences approach the short run effect of the 2007 reform on three dimensions: 1) the average CO 2 intensity of new registered vehicles, 2) the relative change between low and high polluting cars in the market and 3) the market share of diesel cars.
The change in the tax structure did indeed result in an important reduction of the average CO 2 intensity. The estimated treatment effect is about 7.5 g of CO 2 per km less then we would have had without the reform. This reduction accounts for about half of the overall reduction in CO 2 intensity when including exogenous fuel efficiency improvements associated with the supply side of the market. The observed improvement in CO 2 performance is the result of a shift in demand toward greener vehicles and an increase of the diesel market share. The reported results show that, within the year of the policy implementation, the share of highly polluting vehicles dropped by about 12 percentage points as a result of the policy reform. Further, because of the substitution between the engine size component and the CO 2 intensity component, the market share of diesel cars has increased in the short run by about 20 percentage points.
This study also investigates whether the implementation of the reform has affected other characteristics such as weight, power, and engine size of the new purchased vehicles and whether it affected the total number of registrations. No significant change is estimated for the number of registration and for weight. A small and weakly significant increases is found in the average power of new cars. Lastly, a significant increase of about 2.6% in the average size of the engines is estimated. Table 7 shows the tax bands for each element used to calculate the registration tax for the years considered in this analysis. Before 2007, the VRT was calculated using three characteristic of a vehicle: its weigh (km); its engine displacement (cylinder capacity cm3); and its power (kW). From January 2007, it was calculated based on the weight (kg), power (kW), and CO 2 intensity (g/km) of the purchased vehicle. Before 2007, the weight component accounted on average for 54% of the overall registration tax, while the power and engine size components accounted for 19% and 27% respectively. After the intervention, the new CO 2 intensity component accounted for about 18% of the total tax, while the power component remained quite stable around 20%. As a consequence, the vehicle's weight became more important and accounts for about 60% of the overall registration tax (Figure 10 ). To assess the effect of the reform on the tax it is useful to separate vehicles by fuel type. Diesel cars have, on average, larger engine size, higher weight, and higher power, but lower CO 2 intensity than their gasoline equivalents ( Figure 11 ). This meant that when the registration tax was calculated based on the engine size, diesel-fuelled vehicles were more expensive than gasoline cars with similar characteristics. Because of the substitution of the engine size component with the CO 2 emissions intensity, diesel cars became relatively cheaper (Figure 12) . Specifically, the difference in registration tax for diesel and gasoline cars decreased from an average of 56 000 NOK in 2006 to an average of 32 000 NOK in 2007. By plotting each component of the registration tax against the total value of the VRT expressed in thousand NOK, it is possible to understand how the tax has changed over time, and in particular, how the total value of the tax changed after the reform in 2007. The marginal tax rate for the weight component is almost unchanged through the years, while the marginal rate based on the car's power increased in 2007, making vehicles with engine power higher than 130 kW more expensive (Figure 13 ).
Comparing the CO 2 intensity component introduced in 2007 with the engine size component of 2006, it is clear that the tax calculated over the CO 2 emissions factor is steeper ( Figure 14) . As a consequence, the monetary value of registration tax became higher for highly-polluting vehicles compared to tax values registered in 2006. 
C Robustness check
To ensure the robustness of the estimation results presented in this work, the estimation for all outcome variables is carried out by postponing the after-treatment period. In the original specification the post-period consists of 9 months from April-December. Tables 8, 9 , and 10 report the estimated coefficients when the post-treatment observations (t 2 , t 4 ) are taken from May-December, June-December, and July-December respectively. The results are robust to the specification used since the coefficients are stable. 
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